Abstract
As assurance cases have grown in popularity for safety-critical systems, so too has their complexity and thus the need for methods to systematically build them. Assurance cases can grow too large and too abstract for anyone but the original builders to understand, making reuse difficult. Reuse is important because different systems might have identical or similar components, and a good solution for one system should be applicable to similar systems. Prior research has shown engineers can alleviate some of the complexity issues through modularity and identifying common patterns which are more easily understood for reuse across different systems. However, we believe these patterns are too complicated for users who lack expertise in software engineering or assurance cases. This paper suggests the concept of lower-level patterns which we call recipes. We use the safety-critical field of synthetic biology, as an example discipline to demonstrate how a recipe can be built and applied.
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This work was supported in part by the National Institute of Justice grant 2016-R2-CX-0023 and the National Science Foundation Grant CCF-1745775.
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Firestone, J., Cohen, M.B. (2018). The Assurance Recipe: Facilitating Assurance Patterns. In: Gallina, B., Skavhaug, A., Schoitsch, E., Bitsch, F. (eds) Computer Safety, Reliability, and Security. SAFECOMP 2018. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 11094. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-99229-7_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-99229-7_3
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