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International Symposium on Algorithms and Computation

ISAAC 2003: Algorithms and Computation pp 696–704Cite as

Equilibria for Networks with Malicious Users

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 2906))

Abstract

We consider the problem of characterizing user equilibria and optimal solutions for selfish routing in a given network. We extend the known models by considering malicious behaviour. While selfish users follow a strategy that minimizes their individual cost, a malicious user will use his flow through the network in an effort to cause the maximum possible damage to this cost. We define a generalized model, present characterizations of flows at Wardrop equilibrium and prove bounds for the ratio of the social cost of a flow at Wardrop equilibrium over the cost when centralized coordination among users is allowed.

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References

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Dept. of Computing and Software, McMaster University, 1280 Main St. West, Hamilton, Ontario, L8S 4K1, Canada

    George Karakostas

  2. Computer Science Department, University of Toronto, 10 King’s College Road, Toronto, ON, M5S 3G4, Canada

    Anastasios Viglas

Authors
  1. George Karakostas
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  2. Anastasios Viglas
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. School of Science and Technology, Kwansei Gakuin University, Sanda, Japan

    Toshihide Ibaraki

  2. Department of Architecture and Architectural Engineering, Kyoto University, 615-8540, Nishikyo-ku, Kyoto, Japan

    Naoki Katoh

  3. Department of Computer Science and Communication Engineering, Kyushu University, 812-8581, Fukuoka, Japan

    Hirotaka Ono

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© 2003 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Karakostas, G., Viglas, A. (2003). Equilibria for Networks with Malicious Users. In: Ibaraki, T., Katoh, N., Ono, H. (eds) Algorithms and Computation. ISAAC 2003. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 2906. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-24587-2_71

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-24587-2_71

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-20695-8

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-24587-2

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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