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Automation-Considered Logic of Authentication and Key Distribution

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 2908))

Abstract

This paper presents an automation-considered logic of authentication for reasoning about principals’ belief on authentication and key distribution protocols. The so-called ASVO logic is based upon the famous SVO logic but designed in the slightly different way that minimizes the protocol idealization needs. For the purpose, message receiving and message recognition are reformulated in the similar semantic model. As an experimental study, we implemented the proposed logic to a semi-automated formal verification tool, and analyzed several protocols.

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© 2004 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Kwon, T., Lim, S. (2004). Automation-Considered Logic of Authentication and Key Distribution. In: Chae, KJ., Yung, M. (eds) Information Security Applications. WISA 2003. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 2908. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-24591-9_33

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-24591-9_33

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-20827-3

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-24591-9

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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