Abstract
Tagging schemes have been used in security protocols to ensure that the analysis of such protocols can work with messages of bounded length. When the set of nonces is bounded, this leads to decidability of secrecy. In this paper, we show that tagging schemes can be used to obtain decidability of secrecy even in the presence of unboundedly many nonces.
We thank the anonymous referees for detailed comments, which have helped to improve the presentation greatly, both in terms of the modelling and the proofs.
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Ramanujam, R., Suresh, S.P. (2003). Tagging Makes Secrecy Decidable with Unbounded Nonces as Well. In: Pandya, P.K., Radhakrishnan, J. (eds) FST TCS 2003: Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science. FSTTCS 2003. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 2914. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-24597-1_31
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-24597-1_31
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