Abstract
In classical economics theory, the market clearing price is determined by the aggregate demand and supply functions of the market. However, in the real world, there are many situation where individuals having imperfect knowledge will trade bilaterally rather than trading at a global market price. Epstein and Axtell proposed a model of bilateral trading in a mobile environment. Individuals may be willing to settle for a price less profiting to themselves. This paper seeks to make clear the characteristics of bilateral trading under the poor society and the rich society. We compare the bilateral trading models with global price, with local price, and with strategic interaction. We especially investigate collective market behavior with and without strategic interaction at individual levels. We show that the model with local market price without strategic interaction shows results close to that found in a global price model. These two models create stable and equitable market behavior, however, they are inefficient. We show that agents with strategic consideration exhibit unstable but the most efficient market behaviors.
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Tomita, S., Namatame, A. (2003). Bilateral Tradings with and without Strategic Thinking. In: Hales, D., Edmonds, B., Norling, E., Rouchier, J. (eds) Multi-Agent-Based Simulation III. MABS 2003. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 2927. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-24613-8_6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-24613-8_6
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-20736-8
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