Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in
Book cover

Australasian Conference on Information Security and Privacy

ACISP 2004: Information Security and Privacy pp 236–247Cite as

How to Remove MAC from DHIES

  • Conference paper

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 3108))

Abstract

In this paper, we show that MAC can be eliminated from DHIES if the underlying symmetric-key encryption scheme is secure in the sense of IND-CCA. Further, ElGamal encryption part of DHIES without MAC is generalized to Half-Recovery (HR) schemes. Dependent-RSA encryption scheme [12] and Blum-Goldwasser encryption scheme [6] can be used as an HR scheme, for exmaple. Our construction also offers the first secure public-key encryption schemes with no redundancy in the standard model.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.

Chapter
USD   29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD   84.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD   109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Learn about institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  1. Abdalla, M., Bellare, M., Rogaway, P.: DHAES: an encryption scheme based on the Diffie-Hellman problem. Submission to IEEE P1363 (1998)

    Google Scholar 

  2. Abdalla, M., Bellare, M., Rogaway, P.: The oracle Diffie-Hellman assumption and an analysis of DHIES. In: Naccache, D. (ed.) CT-RSA 2001. LNCS, vol. 2020, pp. 143–158. Springer, Heidelberg (2001)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  3. American National Standards Institute (ANSI) X9.F1 subcommittee. ANSI X9.63 Public key cryptography for the Financial Services Industry: Elliptic curve key agreement and key transport schemes, Working draft version 2.0. (1998)

    Google Scholar 

  4. Bellare, M., Desai, A., Jokipii, E., Rogaway, P.: A concrete security treatment of secret-key encryption: Analysis of the DES modes of operation. In: Proc. of the 38th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science - FOCS 1997, pp. 394–403. IEEE, Los Alamitos (1997); Current version available at URL of first author

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  5. Bellare, M., Rogaway, P.: Random oracles are practical: A paradigm for designing efficient protocols. In: ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security 1993, pp. 62–73 (1993)

    Google Scholar 

  6. Blum, M., Goldwasser, S.: An efficient probabilistic public key encryption scheme which hides all partial information. In: Blakely, G.R., Chaum, D. (eds.) CRYPTO 1984. LNCS, vol. 196, pp. 289–302. Springer, Heidelberg (1985)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  7. Cramer, R., Shoup, V.: Design and analysis of practical public-key encryption schemes secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack. SIAM J. Comput. 33(1), 167–226 (electronic) (2003)

    Article  MATH  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  8. Desai, A.: New paradigms for constructing symmetric encryption schemes secure against chosen-ciphertext attack. In: Bellare, M. (ed.) CRYPTO 2000. LNCS, vol. 1880, pp. 394–412. Springer, Heidelberg (2000)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  9. Halevi, S., Rogaway, P.: A tweakable enciphering mode. In: Boneh, D. (ed.) CRYPTO 2003. LNCS, vol. 2729, pp. 482–499. Springer, Heidelberg (2003)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  10. Halevi, S., Rogaway, P.: A parallelizable enciphering mode. In: Okamoto, T. (ed.) CT-RSA 2004. LNCS, vol. 2964, pp. 292–304. Springer, Heidelberg (2004)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  11. Phan, D., Pointcheval, D.: Chosen-ciphertext security without redundancy. In: Laih, C.-S. (ed.) ASIACRYPT 2003. LNCS, vol. 2894, pp. 1–18. Springer, Heidelberg (2003)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  12. Pointcheval, D.: New public key cryptosystems based on the Dependent-RSA problems. In: Stern, J. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 1999. LNCS, vol. 1592, pp. 239–254. Springer, Heidelberg (1999)

    Google Scholar 

  13. Shoup, V.: Using hash functions as a hedge against chosen ciphertext attack. In: Preneel, B. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 2000. LNCS, vol. 1807, pp. 275–288. Springer, Heidelberg (2000)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  14. U.S. Department of Commerce/National Bureau of Standards, National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Virginia. FIPS 197. Advanced Encryption Standard. Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 197 (2001)

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Ibaraki University, 4-12-1 Nakanarusawa, Hitachi, Ibaraki, 316-8511, Japan

    Kaoru Kurosawa

  2. Tokyo Institute of Technology, 2-12-1 Ookayama, Meguro-ku, Tokyo, 152-8552, Japan

    Toshihiko Matsuo

Authors
  1. Kaoru Kurosawa
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  2. Toshihiko Matsuo
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Centre for Advanced Computing - Algorithms and Cryptography Department of Computing, Macquarie University, Australia

    Huaxiong Wang

  2. Department of Computing, Macquarie University, NSW 2109, Sydney, Australia

    Josef Pieprzyk

  3. Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia

    Vijay Varadharajan

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2004 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

About this paper

Cite this paper

Kurosawa, K., Matsuo, T. (2004). How to Remove MAC from DHIES. In: Wang, H., Pieprzyk, J., Varadharajan, V. (eds) Information Security and Privacy. ACISP 2004. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 3108. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-27800-9_21

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-27800-9_21

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-22379-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-27800-9

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation