Abstract
Pit is a multi-player card game where actions consist of bidding for and swapping cards of different suits. The suits represent commodities. The first player to declare that he holds a full suit, wins the game. That player is said to corner the market in that commodity. From different points of view the Pit game has been investigated in [1, 2]. The former uses Pit to illustrate the supply and demand cycle in the general economics classroom. The latter may be seen as a study in requirements engineering for electronic market simulations. The logical dynamics of the game is spelled out in full detail in [3], using the language of [4]. This epistemic analysis is necessary to define Pit as a game. This poster is an exploration into the game theory of Pit.
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References
Holt, C.: Trading in a pit market. Journal of Economic Perspectives 10(1), 193–203 (1996)
Purvis, M., Nowostawski, M., Cranefield, S., Oliveira, M.: Multi-agent interaction technology for peer-to-peer computing in electronic trading environments. In: Moro, G., Sartori, C., Singh, M. (eds.) Second International Workshop on Agents and Peer-to-Peer Computing, Melbourne, pp. 103–114 (2003)
van Ditmarsch, H.: Logic and game theory of pit (2004) (manuscript)
van Ditmarsch, H.: Descriptions of game actions. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 11, 349–365 (2002)
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© 2004 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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van Ditmarsch, H.P. (2004). Some Game Theory of Pit. In: Zhang, C., W. Guesgen, H., Yeap, WK. (eds) PRICAI 2004: Trends in Artificial Intelligence. PRICAI 2004. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 3157. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-28633-2_107
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-28633-2_107
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