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Reducing Server Trust in Private Proxy Auctions

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 3184))

Abstract

We investigate proxy auctions, an auction model which is proving very successful for on-line businesses (e.g., [9]), where a trusted server manages bids from clients by continuously updating the current price of the item and the currently winning bid as well as keeping private the winning client’s maximum bid.

We propose techniques for reducing the trust in the server by defining and achieving a security property, called server integrity. Informally, this property protects clients from a novel and large class of attacks from a corrupted server by allowing them to verify the correctness of updates to the current price and the currently winning bid. Our new auction scheme achieves server integrity and satisfies two important properties that are not enjoyed by previous work in the literature: it has minimal interaction, and only requires a single trusted server.

While the privacy property of our scheme holds under a standard intractability assumption, the server integrity property holds unconditionally.

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Di Crescenzo, G., Herranz, J., Sáez, G. (2004). Reducing Server Trust in Private Proxy Auctions. In: Katsikas, S., Lopez, J., Pernul, G. (eds) Trust and Privacy in Digital Business. TrustBus 2004. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 3184. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-30079-3_9

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-30079-3_9

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-22919-3

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-30079-3

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