Abstract
We consider the problem of scheduling jobs on related machines owned by selfish agents. Previously, Archer and Tardos showed a 2-approximation randomized mechanism which is truthful in expectation only (a weaker notion of truthfulness). We provide a 5-approximation deterministic truthful mechanism, the first deterministic truthful result for the problem.
In case the number of machines is constant, we provide a deterministic Fully Polynomial Time Approximation Scheme (FPTAS) algorithm, and a suitable payment scheme that yields a truthful mechanism for the problem. This result, which is based on converting FPTAS to monotone FPTAS, improves a previous result of Auletta et al, who showed a (4+ε)-approximation truthful mechanism.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.
Buying options
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Learn about institutional subscriptionsPreview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
Alon, N., Azar, Y., Woeginger, G., Yadid, T.: Approximation schemes for scheduling on parallel machines. Journal of Scheduling 1(1), 55–66 (1998)
Ambrosio, P., Auletta, E.: Deterministic monotone algorithms for scheduling on related machines. In: Persiano, G., Solis-Oba, R. (eds.) WAOA 2004. LNCS, vol. 3351, pp. 267–280. Springer, Heidelberg (2005)
Archer, A., Tardos, E.: Truthful mechanisms for one-parameter agents. In: Proceedings of the 42nd IEEE symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, p. 482. IEEE Computer Society Press, Los Alamitos (2001)
Archer, A.: Mechanisms for Discrete Optimization with Rational Agents. PhD thesis, Cornell University (2004)
Auletta, V., Prisco, R.D., Penna, P., Persiano, P.: Deterministic truthful approximation mechanisms for scheduling related machines. In: Diekert, V., Habib, M. (eds.) STACS 2004. LNCS, vol. 2996, pp. 608–619. Springer, Heidelberg (2004)
Clarke, E.: Multipart pricing of public goods. Public Choice (1971)
Epstein, L., Sgall, J.: Approximation schemes for scheduling on uniformly related and identical parallel machines. In: Proceedings of the 7th Annual European Symposium on Algorithms, pp. 151–162. Springer, Heidelberg (1999)
Gonzalez, T., Ibarra, O.H., Sahni, S.: Bounds for LPT schedules on uniform processors. SIAM Journal on Computing 6(1), 155–166 (1977)
Groves, T.: Incentives in teams. Econemetrica (1973)
Hochbaum, D., Shmoys, D.: A polynomial approximation scheme for scheduling on uniform processors: Using the dual approximation approach. SIAM Journal on Computing 17(3), 539–551 (1988)
Horowitz, E., Sahni, S.: Exact and approximate algorithms for scheduling non-identical processors. Journal of the Association for Computing Machinery 23, 317–327 (1976)
Nisan, N., Ronen, A.: Algorithmic mechanism design. In: 31st ACM Symp. on Theory of Computing, pp. 129–140 (1999)
Nisan, N., Ronen, A.: Computationally feasible vcg mechanisms. In: Proceedings of the 2nd ACM conference on Electronic commerce, pp. 242–252. ACM Press, New York (2000)
Papadimitriou, C.: Algorithms, games, and the internet. In: Proceedings of the thirty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing, pp. 749–753. ACM Press, New York (2001)
Tardos, E.: Network games. In: Proceedings of the Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing (2004)
Vickery, W.: Counterspeculation, auctions and competitive sealed tenders. Journal of Finance (1961)
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2005 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
About this paper
Cite this paper
Andelman, N., Azar, Y., Sorani, M. (2005). Truthful Approximation Mechanisms for Scheduling Selfish Related Machines. In: Diekert, V., Durand, B. (eds) STACS 2005. STACS 2005. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 3404. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-31856-9_6
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-31856-9_6
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-24998-6
Online ISBN: 978-3-540-31856-9
eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)