Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Exploiting Empirical Engagement in Authentication Protocol Design

  • Conference paper
Security in Pervasive Computing (SPC 2005)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 3450))

Included in the following conference series:

Abstract

We develop the theme of an earlier paper [3], namely that security protocols for pervasive computing frequently need to exploit empirical channels and that the latter can be classified by variants of the Dolev-Yao attacker model. We refine this classification of channels and study three protocols in depth: two from our earlier paper and one new one.

This research is conducted as part of the FORWARD project which is supported by the U.K. Department of Trade and Industry via the Next Wave Technologies and Markets programme: www.forward-project.org.uk.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Log in via an institution
Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 39.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 54.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  1. Asokan, N., Ginzboorg, P.: Key-agreement in ad-hoc networks. Computer Communications 23(17), 1627–1637 (2000)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  2. Balfanz, D., Smetters, D., Stewart, P., Wong, H.: Talking to strangers: Authentication in ad-hoc wireless networks. In: Symposium on Network and Distributed Systems Security (NDSS 2002), San Diego, California, (Feburary 2002)

    Google Scholar 

  3. Creese, S., Goldsmith, M.H., Roscoe, B., Zakiuddin, I.: The attacker in ubiquitous computing environments: Formalising the threat model. In: T. Dimitrakos, F. Martinelli (eds.), Workshop on Formal Aspects in Security and Trust, Pisa, Italy, IIT-CNR Technical Report (September 2003)

    Google Scholar 

  4. Dolev, D., Yao, A.C.: On the security of public key protocols. IEEE Transactions on Information Theory 29(2) (1983)

    Google Scholar 

  5. Hoare, C.A.R.: Communicating Sequential Processes. Prentice Hall International, Englewood Cliffs (1985)

    MATH  Google Scholar 

  6. Kindberg, T., Zhang, K.: Validating and securing spontaneous associations between wireless devices. In: Boyd, C., Mao, W. (eds.) ISC 2003. LNCS, vol. 2851, pp. 44–53. Springer, Heidelberg (2003)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  7. Roscoe, A.W.: The Theory and Practice of Concurrency , p.xv+ 565. Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs (1998) ISBN 0-13-6774409-5

    Google Scholar 

  8. Ryan, P.Y.A., Schneider, S.A., Goldsmith, M.H., Lowe, G., Roscoe, A.W.: The Modelling and Analysis of Security Protocols: the CSP Approach. Addison-Wesley, Reading (2001)

    Google Scholar 

  9. Stajano, F., Anderson, R.: The resurrecting duckling: Security issues for ad-hoc wireless networks. In: Christianson, B., Crispo, B., Roe, M. (eds.) Security Protocols, 7th International Workshop Proceedings LNCS, pp. 172–194. Springer, Heidelberg (1999)

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. QinetiQ, Malvern, UK

    Sadie Creese, Richard Harrison & Irfan Zakiuddin

  2. Formal Systems (Europe) Ltd,  

    Michael Goldsmith, Bill Roscoe & Paul Whittaker

  3. Worcester College, University of Oxford,  

    Michael Goldsmith

  4. Computing Laboratory, Oxford University,  

    Bill Roscoe

Authors
  1. Sadie Creese
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  2. Michael Goldsmith
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  3. Richard Harrison
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  4. Bill Roscoe
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  5. Paul Whittaker
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  6. Irfan Zakiuddin
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. DFKI, Stuhlsatzenhausweg 3, D-66123, Saarbrücken, Germany

    Dieter Hutter

  2. Federal Office for Information Security (BSI), Godesberger Allee 185-189, 53175, Bonn, Germany

    Markus Ullmann

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2005 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

About this paper

Cite this paper

Creese, S., Goldsmith, M., Harrison, R., Roscoe, B., Whittaker, P., Zakiuddin, I. (2005). Exploiting Empirical Engagement in Authentication Protocol Design. In: Hutter, D., Ullmann, M. (eds) Security in Pervasive Computing. SPC 2005. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 3450. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-32004-3_14

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-32004-3_14

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-25521-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-32004-3

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation