Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Exploiting Generic Aspects of Security Models in Formal Developments

  • Chapter
Book cover Mechanizing Mathematical Reasoning

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNAI,volume 2605))

  • 1057 Accesses

Abstract

The construction of security models from scratch is a difficult, time consuming, and expensive task. In this article, we demonstrate how to exploit generic concepts, in particular the concept of secure information flow, to simplify the construction of security models. Requirements concerned with confidentiality or integrity can often be expressed nicely as restrictions on the allowed flow of information. For a verification of these restrictions, it is necessary to explicate formally what information flow means. Various information flow properties have been suggested for this purpose and we employ MAKS, the “Modular Assembly Kit for Security” [Man00a], for a unified perspective on these properties. How to exploit the generic security models based on secure information flow in practice is described in the context of the VSE system [AHL + 00].

This work has been partly supported by the German Research Foundation (DFG) and the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF).

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Log in via an institution
Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 84.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  1. Autexier, S., Hutter, D., Langenstein, B., Mantel, H., Rock, G., Schairer, A., Stephan, W., Vogt, R., Wolpers, A.: VSE: Formal Methods Meet Industrial Needs. Special Issue on Mechanized Theorem Proving for Technology Transfer of the STTT-Springer International Journal on Software Tools for Technology Transfer 3(1), 66–77 (2000)

    MATH  Google Scholar 

  2. Autexier, S., Hutter, D., Mantel, H., Schairer, A.: System Description: INKA 5.0 – A Logic Voyager. In: Ganzinger, H. (ed.) CADE 1999. LNCS (LNAI), vol. 1632, pp. 207–211. Springer, Heidelberg (1999)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  3. Autexier, S., Hutter, D., Mossakowski, T., Schairer, A.: The Development Graph Manager MAYA. In: Kirchner, H., Ringeissen, C. (eds.) AMAST 2002. LNCS, vol. 2422, p. 495. Springer, Heidelberg (2002)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  4. Biba, K.J.: Integrity Considerations for Secure Computer Systems. Technical Report MTR-3153, MITRE (1977)

    Google Scholar 

  5. Bell, D.E., LaPadula, L.: Secure Computer Systems: Unified Exposition and Multics Interpretation. Technical Report MTR-2997, MITRE (March 1976)

    Google Scholar 

  6. Common Criteria Project Sponsoring Organisations. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CC) Version 2.1(1999); Also appeared as ISO/IEC 15408: IT – Security techniques – Evaluation criteria for IT security

    Google Scholar 

  7. Focardi, R., Gorrieri, R.: A Classification of Security Properties for Process Algebras. Journal of Computer Security 3(1), 5–33 (1995)

    Google Scholar 

  8. Focardi, R., Ghelli, A., Gorrieri, R.: Using Non Interference for the Analysis of Security Protocols. In: Proceedings of DIMACS Workshop on Design and Formal Verification of Security Protocols (1997)

    Google Scholar 

  9. Focardi, R., Gorrieri, R., Martinelli, F.: Non Interference for the Analysis of Cryptographic Protocols. In: Welzl, E., Montanari, U., Rolim, J.D.P. (eds.) ICALP 2000. LNCS, vol. 1853, p. 354. Springer, Heidelberg (2000)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  10. Goguen, J.A., Meseguer, J.: Security Policies and Security Models. In: Proceedings of the IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, pp. 11–20 (1982)

    Google Scholar 

  11. Goguen, J.A., Meseguer, J.: Inference Control and Unwinding. In: Proceedings of the IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, pp. 75–86 (1984)

    Google Scholar 

  12. Guttman, J.D., Nadel, M.E.: What Needs Securing? In: Proceedings of the IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop, pp. 34–57 (1988)

    Google Scholar 

  13. Hoare, C.A.R.: Communicating Sequential Processes. Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs (1985)

    MATH  Google Scholar 

  14. Haigh, J.T., Young, W.D.: Extending the Noninterference Version of MLS for SAT. IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering SE-13(2), 141–150 (1987)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  15. Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. Information Technology Security Evaluation Criteria, ITSEC (1991)

    Google Scholar 

  16. Jacob, J.: On the Derivation of Secure Components. In: Proceedings of the IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, pp. 242–247 (1989)

    Google Scholar 

  17. Johnson, D.M., Thayer, F.J.: Security and the Composition of Machines. In: Proceedings of the Computer Security Foundations Workshop, pp. 72–89 (1988)

    Google Scholar 

  18. Jürjens, J.: Secure Information Flow for Concurrent Processes. In: Palamidessi, C. (ed.) CONCUR 2000. LNCS, vol. 1877, pp. 395–409. Springer, Heidelberg (2000)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  19. Lampson, B.W.: Protection. In: Proceedings of 5th Princeton Conference on Information Sciences and Systems, p. 437 (1971)

    Google Scholar 

  20. Lampson, B.W.: A Note on the Confinement Problem. Communications of the ACS 16(10), 613–615 (1973)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  21. Mantel, H.: Possibilistic Definitions of Security – An Assembly Kit. In: Proceedings of the IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop, pp. 185–199 (2000)

    Google Scholar 

  22. Mantel, H.: Unwinding Possibilistic Security Properties. In: Cuppens, F., Deswarte, Y., Gollmann, D., Waidner, M. (eds.) ESORICS 2000. LNCS, vol. 1895, pp. 238–254. Springer, Heidelberg (2000)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  23. Mantel, H.: Information Flow Control and Applications – Bridging a Gap. In: Oliveira, J.N., Zave, P. (eds.) FME 2001. LNCS, vol. 2021, pp. 153–172. Springer, Heidelberg (2001)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  24. Mantel, H.: Preserving Information Flow Properties under Refinement. In: Proceedings of the IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, pp. 78–91 (2001)

    Google Scholar 

  25. Mantel, H.: On the Composition of Secure Systems. In: Proceedings of the IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, pp. 88–101 (2002)

    Google Scholar 

  26. McCullough, D.: Specifications for Multi-Level Security and a Hook-Up Property. In: Proceedings of the IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, pp. 161–166 (1987)

    Google Scholar 

  27. McLean, J.D.: A Comment on the ”Basic Security Theorem” of Bell and LaPadula. Information Processing Letters 20, 67–70 (1985)

    Article  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  28. McLean, J.D.: Reasoning about Security Models. In: Proceedings of the IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, pp. 123–131 (1987)

    Google Scholar 

  29. McLean, J.D.: The Specification and Modeling of Computer Security. IEEE Computer 23(1), 9–16 (1990)

    Google Scholar 

  30. McLean, J.D.: Proving Noninterference and Functional Correctness using Traces. Journal of Computer Security 1(1), 37–57 (1992)

    MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  31. McLean, J.D.: A General Theory of Composition for Trace Sets Closed under Selective Interleaving Functions. In: Proceedings of the IEEE Symposium on Research in Security and Privacy, pp. 79–93 (1994)

    Google Scholar 

  32. McLean, J.D.: Security Models. In: Marciniak, J. (ed.) Encyclopedia of Software Engineering. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., Chichester (1994)

    Google Scholar 

  33. Millen, J.K.: Unwinding Forward Correctability. In: Proceedings of the Computer Security Foundations Workshop, pp. 2–10 (1994)

    Google Scholar 

  34. Mantel, H., Schairer, A., Kabatnik, M., Kreutzer, M., Zugenmaier, A.: Using Information Flow Control to Evaluate Access Protection of Location Information in Mobile Communication Networks. Technical Report 159, CS Department, University of Freiburg (2001)

    Google Scholar 

  35. O’Halloran, C.: A Calculus of Information Flow. In: Proceedings of the European Symposium on Research in Computer Security (ESORICS), pp. 147–159 (1990)

    Google Scholar 

  36. Pinsky, S.: Absorbing Covers and Intransitive Non-Interference. In: Proceedings of the IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, pp. 102–113 (1995)

    Google Scholar 

  37. Roscoe, A.W., Goldsmith, M.H.: What is intransitive noninterference? In: Proceedings of the 12th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop, pp. 228–238 (1999)

    Google Scholar 

  38. Roscoe, A.W.: CSP and Determinism in Security Modelling. In: Proceedings of the IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, pp. 114–127 (1995)

    Google Scholar 

  39. Ryan, P.Y.A., Schneider, S.A.: Process Algebra and Non-interference. In: Proceedings of the 12th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop, pp. 214–227 (1999)

    Google Scholar 

  40. Rushby, J.: Noninterference, Transitivity, and Channel-Control Security Policies. Technical Report CSL-92-02, SRI International (1992)

    Google Scholar 

  41. Roscoe, A.W., Wulf, L.: Composing and Decomposing Systems under Security Properties. In: Proceedings of the 8th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop, pp. 9–15 (1995)

    Google Scholar 

  42. Ryan, P.Y.A.: A CSP Formulation of Non-Interference and Unwinding. Cipher, 19–30 (Winter 1991)

    Google Scholar 

  43. Schneider, S.: May Testing, Non-interference, and Compositionality. Technical Report CSD-TR-00-02, Royal Holloway, University of London (2001)

    Google Scholar 

  44. Schellhorn, G., Reif, W., Schairer, A., Karger, P., Austel, V., Toll, D.: Verification of a Formal Security Model for Multiapplicative Smart Cards. In: Cuppens, F., Deswarte, Y., Gollmann, D., Waidner, M. (eds.) ESORICS 2000. LNCS, vol. 1895, pp. 17–36. Springer, Heidelberg (2000)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  45. Sutherland, D.: A Model of Information. In: 9th National Computer Security Conference (1986)

    Google Scholar 

  46. Wittbold, J.T., Johnson, D.M.: Information Flow in Nondeterministic Systems. In: Proceedings of the IEEE Symposium on Research in Security and Privacy, pp. 144–161 (1990)

    Google Scholar 

  47. Zakinthinos, A.: On the Composition of Security Properties. PhD thesis, Graduate Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of Toronto (1996)

    Google Scholar 

  48. Zakinthinos, A., Lee, E.S.: A General Theory of Security Properties. In: Proceedings of the IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, pp. 94–102 (1997)

    Google Scholar 

  49. Zakinthinos, A., Lee, E.S.: Composing Secure Systems that have Emergent Properties. In: Proceedings of the 11th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop, pp. 117–122 (1998)

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. German Research Center for Artificial Intelligence (DFKI), Stuhlsatzenhausweg 3, 66123, Saarbrücken, Germany

    Heiko Mantel & Axel Schairer

Authors
  1. Heiko Mantel
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  2. Axel Schairer
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. DFKI, Stuhlsatzenhausweg 3, D-66123, Saarbrücken, Germany

    Dieter Hutter

  2. German Research Center for Artificial Intelligence, DFKI GmbH,  

    Werner Stephan

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2005 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Mantel, H., Schairer, A. (2005). Exploiting Generic Aspects of Security Models in Formal Developments. In: Hutter, D., Stephan, W. (eds) Mechanizing Mathematical Reasoning. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 2605. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-32254-2_26

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-32254-2_26

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-25051-7

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-32254-2

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation