Abstract
This paper presents SEAS, the Secure E-voting Applet System, a protocol for implementing a secure and private system for polling over computer networks, usable in distributed organizations whose members may range up to dozens of thousands. We consider an architecture requiring the minimum number of servers involved in the validation and voting phases. Sensus, [7], a well known e-voting protocol, requires only two servers, namely a validator and a tallier. Even if satisfying most of the security requirements of an e-voting system, Sensus suffers of a vulnerability that allows one of the entities involved in the election process to cast its own votes in place of those that abstain from the vote. SEAS is a portable and flexible system that preserves the lightness of Sensus, but it avoids the mentioned weakness. We propose a prototype implementation of SEAS based on Java applet and XML technology.
Work partially supported by MIUR Project: “ Strumenti, Ambienti e Applicazioni Innovative per la Società dell’Informazione”, sottoprogetto SP1: Reti INTERNET: “efficienza, integrazione e sicurezza”.
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Baiardi, F., Falleni, A., Granchi, R., Martinelli, F., Petrocchi, M., Vaccarelli, A. (2004). SEAS: A Secure E-Voting Applet System. In: Futatsugi, K., Mizoguchi, F., Yonezaki, N. (eds) Software Security - Theories and Systems. ISSS 2003. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 3233. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-37621-7_17
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-37621-7_17
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