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Formal Analysis of the NetBill Electronic Commerce Protocol

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Software Security - Theories and Systems (ISSS 2003)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 3233))

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Abstract

NetBill is an electronic commerce protocol, which allows customers to purchase information goods from merchants over the Internet. It supports goods delivery as well as payment, while many other electronic commerce protocols do not take care of goods delivery. In this paper, we describe the case study in which NetBill has been analyzed with the OTS/CafeOBJ method.

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Ogata, K., Futatsugi, K. (2004). Formal Analysis of the NetBill Electronic Commerce Protocol. In: Futatsugi, K., Mizoguchi, F., Yonezaki, N. (eds) Software Security - Theories and Systems. ISSS 2003. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 3233. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-37621-7_3

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-37621-7_3

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-23635-1

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-37621-7

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