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Agent-Based Modeling of Efficient Markets

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Intelligent Data Engineering and Automated Learning (IDEAL 2003)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 2690))

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Abstract

We consider the Minority Game which models the collective behavior of agents simultaneously and adaptively competing in a market, or distributively performing load balancing tasks. The variance of the buy-sell decisions is a measure of market inefficiency. When the initial condition of the strategies picked by the agents are the same, the market is inefficient in the regime of low agent complexity, caused by the maladaptive behavior of the agents. However, the market becomes increasingly efficient when the randomness in the initial condition increases. Implications to the occurence of maladaptation, the prediction of market trend and the search for optimal load balancing are discussed.

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© 2003 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Lim, S.W., Wong, K.Y.M., Luo, P. (2003). Agent-Based Modeling of Efficient Markets. In: Liu, J., Cheung, Ym., Yin, H. (eds) Intelligent Data Engineering and Automated Learning. IDEAL 2003. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 2690. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-45080-1_4

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-45080-1_4

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-40550-4

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-45080-1

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