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Composition of Cryptographic Protocols in a Probabilistic Polynomial-Time Process Calculus

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CONCUR 2003 - Concurrency Theory (CONCUR 2003)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 2761))

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Abstract

We describe a probabilistic polynomial-time process calculus for analyzing cryptographic protocols and use it to derive compositionality properties of protocols in the presence of computationally bounded adversaries. We illustrate these concepts on oblivious transfer, an example from cryptography. We also compare our approach with a framework based on interactive Turing machines.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. IST, Center for Logic and Computation, Lisbon, Portugal

    P. Mateus

  2. Department of Computer Science, Stanford University, Stanford, USA

    J. Mitchell

  3. Department of Mathematics, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, USA

    A. Scedrov

Authors
  1. P. Mateus
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  2. J. Mitchell
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  3. A. Scedrov
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Université Paris 7, PPS, Case 7014, 75205, Paris Cedex 13, France

    Roberto Amadio

  2. LIF, CNRS, Aix-Marseille Université, France

    Denis Lugiez

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© 2003 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Mateus, P., Mitchell, J., Scedrov, A. (2003). Composition of Cryptographic Protocols in a Probabilistic Polynomial-Time Process Calculus. In: Amadio, R., Lugiez, D. (eds) CONCUR 2003 - Concurrency Theory. CONCUR 2003. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 2761. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-45187-7_22

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-45187-7_22

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-40753-9

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-45187-7

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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