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Compositional Verification of Secure Streamed Data: A Case Study with EMSS

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Theoretical Computer Science (ICTCS 2003)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 2841))

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Abstract

We consider an instance of the EMSS protocol proposed in [19], authenticating streamed data in the presence of packet loss. We formally prove the integrity property of the instance by applying a compositional proof rule that allows us to check a specification with an arbitrary number of parallel processes. We argue that our approach may be applied to a wider class of stream signature protocols.

Work partially supported by MURST Progetto “Metodi Formali per la Sicurezza ed il Tempo” (MEFISTO); by MIUR project COVER; by Microsoft Research (Cambridge) and by a CSP grant for the project “SeTAPS II”.

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Martinelli, F., Petrocchi, M., Vaccarelli, A. (2003). Compositional Verification of Secure Streamed Data: A Case Study with EMSS . In: Blundo, C., Laneve, C. (eds) Theoretical Computer Science. ICTCS 2003. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 2841. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-45208-9_30

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-45208-9_30

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-20216-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-45208-9

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