Abstract
A recent application in commercial aviation is the electronic distribution of loadable software parts and data. Its safe and beneficial use, however, warrants that information security vulnerabilities are analyzed and mitigated at an adequate assurance level. In our prior work, we have identified security threats and assurance requirements for a generic aircraft asset distribution system or AADS. In this paper, we focus on supporting analytical processes to address security vulnerabilities as well as describing our experiences in applying formal methods to AADS.
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© 2008 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Lintelman, S., Robinson, R., Li, M., Sampigethaya, K. (2008). Formal Methods for Trustworthy Skies: Building Confidence in the Security of Aircraft Assets Distribution. In: Cuellar, J., Maibaum, T., Sere, K. (eds) FM 2008: Formal Methods. FM 2008. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 5014. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-68237-0_28
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-68237-0_28
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-68235-6
Online ISBN: 978-3-540-68237-0
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