Skip to main content

Bounded Unpopularity Matchings

  • Conference paper
Algorithm Theory – SWAT 2008 (SWAT 2008)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNTCS,volume 5124))

Included in the following conference series:

Abstract

We investigate the following problem: given a set of jobs and a set of people with preferences over the jobs, what is the optimal way of matching people to jobs? Here we consider the notion of popularity. A matching M is popular if there is no matching M′ such that more people prefer M′ to M than the other way around. Determining whether a given instance admits a popular matching and, if so, finding one, was studied in [2]. If there is no popular matching, a reasonable substitute is a matching whose unpopularity is bounded. We consider two measures of unpopularity - unpopularity factor denoted by u(M) and unpopularity margin denoted by g(M). McCutchen recently showed that computing a matching M with the minimum value of u(M) or g(M) is NP-hard, and that if G does not admit a popular matching, then we have u(M) ≥ 2 for all matchings M in G.

Here we show that a matching M that achieves u(M) = 2 can be computed in \(O(m\sqrt{n})\) time (where m is the number of edges in G and n is the number of nodes) provided a certain graph H admits a matching that matches all people. We also describe a sequence of graphs: H = H 2, H 3,...,H k such that if H k admits a matching that matches all people, then we can compute in \(O(km\sqrt{n})\) time a matching M such that u(M) ≤ k − 1 and \(g(M) \le n(1-\frac{2}{k})\). Simulation results suggest that our algorithm finds a matching with low unpopularity.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 99.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 129.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  1. Abraham, D.J., Cechlárová, K., Manlove, D.F., Mehlhorn, K.: Pareto-optimality in house allocation problems. In: Fleischer, R., Trippen, G. (eds.) ISAAC 2004. LNCS, vol. 3341, pp. 3–15. Springer, Heidelberg (2004)

    Google Scholar 

  2. Abraham, D.J., Irving, R.W., Kavitha, T., Mehlhorn, K.: Popular matchings. SIAM Journal on Computing 37(4), 1030–1045 (2007), Preliminary version. In: Proc. of 16th SODA, pp. 424-432, (2005)

    Google Scholar 

  3. Abdulkadiroǧlu, A., Sönmez, T.: Random serial dictatorship and the core from random endowments in house allocation problems. Econometrica 66(3), 689–701 (1998)

    Article  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  4. Huang, C.-C., Kavitha, T., Michail, D., Nasre, M.: Bounded Unpopularity Matchings. Dartmouth Computer Science, Technical Report (2008)-616

    Google Scholar 

  5. Gale, D., Shapley, L.S.: College admissions and the stability of marriage. American Mathematical Monthly 69, 9–15 (1962)

    Article  MATH  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  6. Gardenfors, P.: Match making: assignments based on bilateral preferences. Behavioural Sciences 20, 166–173 (1975)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  7. Gusfield, D., Irving, R.W.: The Stable Marriage Problem: Structure and Algorithms. MIT Press, Cambridge (1989)

    MATH  Google Scholar 

  8. Hopcroft, J.E., Karp, R.M.: A n 5/2 Algorithm for Maximum Matchings in Bipartite Graphs. SIAM Journal on Computing 2, 225–231 (1973)

    Article  MATH  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  9. Hylland, A., Zeckhauser, R.: The efficient allocation of individuals to positions. Journal of Political Economy 87(2), 293–314 (1979)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  10. Irving, R.W., Kavitha, T., Mehlhorn, K., Michail, D., Paluch, K.: Rank-maximal matchings. ACM Transactions on Algorithms 2(4), 602–610 (2006), Preliminary version. In: Proc. of 15th SODA, pp. 68-75 (2004)

    Article  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  11. Mahdian, M.: Random popular matchings. In: Proceedings of the 7th ACM Conference on Electronic-Commerce, pp. 238–242 (2006)

    Google Scholar 

  12. Manlove, D.F., Sng, C.: Popular matchings in the capacitated house allocation problem. In: Azar, Y., Erlebach, T. (eds.) ESA 2006. LNCS, vol. 4168, pp. 492–503. Springer, Heidelberg (2006)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  13. McCutchen, M.: The least-unpopularity-factor and least-unpopularity-margin criteria for matching problems with one-sided preferences. In: Proceedings of LATIN 2008, the 8th Latin American Theoretical Informatics Symposium, LNCS, vol. 4957, Springer, Heidelberg (2008)

    Google Scholar 

  14. Mestre, J.: Weighted popular matchings. In: Bugliesi, M., Preneel, B., Sassone, V., Wegener, I. (eds.) ICALP 2006. LNCS, vol. 4051, pp. 715–726. Springer, Heidelberg (2006)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  15. Roth, A.E., Postlewaite, A.: Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods. Journal of Mathematical Economics 4, 131–137 (1977)

    Article  MATH  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  16. Yuan, Y.: Residence exchange wanted: a stable residence exchange problem. European Journal of Operational Research 90, 536–546 (1996)

    Article  MATH  Google Scholar 

  17. Zhou, L.: On a conjecture by Gale about one-sided matching problems. Journal of Economic Theory 52(1), 123–135 (1990)

    Article  MATH  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Editor information

Joachim Gudmundsson

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2008 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

About this paper

Cite this paper

Huang, CC., Kavitha, T., Michail, D., Nasre, M. (2008). Bounded Unpopularity Matchings. In: Gudmundsson, J. (eds) Algorithm Theory – SWAT 2008. SWAT 2008. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 5124. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-69903-3_13

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-69903-3_13

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-69900-2

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-69903-3

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics