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On the Automatic Analysis of Recursive Security Protocols with XOR

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STACS 2007 (STACS 2007)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNTCS,volume 4393))

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Abstract

In many security protocols, such as group protocols, principals have to perform iterative or recursive computations. We call such protocols recursive protocols. Recently, first results on the decidability of the security of such protocols have been obtained. While recursive protocols often employ operators with algebraic, security relevant properties, such as the exclusive OR (XOR), the existing decision procedures, however, cannot deal with such operators and their properties. In this paper, we show that the security of recursive protocols with XOR is decidable (w.r.t. a bounded number of sessions) for a class of protocols in which recursive computations of principals are modeled by certain Horn theories. Interestingly, this result can be obtained by a reduction to the case without XOR. We also show that relaxing certain assumptions of our model lead to undecidability.

This work was partially supported by the DFG under grant KU 1434/4-1.

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Wolfgang Thomas Pascal Weil

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Küsters, R., Truderung, T. (2007). On the Automatic Analysis of Recursive Security Protocols with XOR. In: Thomas, W., Weil, P. (eds) STACS 2007. STACS 2007. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 4393. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-70918-3_55

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-70918-3_55

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-70917-6

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-70918-3

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