Abstract
In social mechanism design, norm negotiation creates individual or contractual obligations fulfilling goals of the agents. The social delegation cycle distinguishes among social goal negotiation, obligation and sanction negotiation and norm acceptance. Power may affect norm negotiation in various ways, and we therefore introduce a new formalization of the social delegation cycle based on power and dependence, without referring to the rule structure of norms, actions, decision variables, tasks, and so on.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
Conte, R., Falcone, R., Sartor, G.: Agents and norms: How to fill the gap? Artificial Intelligence and Law 7(1), 1–15 (1999)
Boella, G., van der Torre, L., Verhagen, H.: Introduction to normative multiagent systems. Computational and Mathematical Organizational Theory (Special issue on Normative Multiagent Systems) 12(2-3), 71–79 (2006)
Boella, G., van der Torre, L.: A game theoretic approach to contracts in multiagent systems. IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man and Cybernetics - Part C 36(1), 68–79 (2006)
Boella, G., van der Torre, L.: Security policies for sharing knowledge in virtual communities. IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man and Cybernetics - Part A 36(3), 439–450 (2006)
Boella, G., van der Torre, L.: Norm negotiation in multiagent systems. International Journal of cooperative Information Systems (IJCIS) 16(1) (2007)
Conte, R., Castelfranchi, C., Dignum, F.P.M.: Autonomous norm acceptance. In: Rao, A.S., Singh, M.P., Müller, J.P. (eds.) ATAL 1998. LNCS (LNAI), vol. 1555, pp. 99–112. Springer, Heidelberg (1999)
Brainov, S., Sandholm, T.: Power, dependence and stability in multi-agent plans. In: Procs. of the 21st National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI’99), pp. 11–16 (1999)
Castelfranchi, C.: Modeling social action for AI agents. Artificial Intelligence 103(1-2), 157–182 (1998)
Conte, R., Sichman, J.: Multi-agent dependence by dependence graphs. In: Procs. of the 1st International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS’02), pp. 483–490 (2002)
Lopez y Lopez, F.: Social Power and Norms: Impact on agent behaviour. PhD thesis (2003)
Castelfranchi, C.: Micro-macro constitution of power. ProtoSociology 18–19 (2003)
Shoham, Y., Tennenholtz, M.: On social laws for artificial agent societies: off-line design. Artificial Intelligence 73(1-2), 231–252 (1995)
Shoham, Y., Tennenholtz, M.: On the emergence of social conventions: Modeling, analysis and simulations. Artificial Intelligence 94(1–2), 139–166 (1997)
Tennenholtz, M.: On stable social laws and qualitative equilibria. Artificial Intelligence 102(1), 1–20 (1998)
Wooldridge, M., Dunne, P.: On the computational complexity of qualitative coalitional games. Artificial Intelligence 158(1), 27–73 (2004)
Simon, H.: A behavioral model of rational choice. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 69, 99–118 (1955)
Boella, G., van der Torre, L.: Enforceable social laws. In: Procs. of the 4th International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS’05), pp. 682–689 (2005)
Boella, G., Sauro, L., van der Torre, L.: Social viewpoints on multiagent systems. In: Procs. of the 3rd International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi Agent Systems (AAMAS’04), pp. 1358–1359 (2004)
Boella, G., van der Torre, L.: Fair distribution of collective obligations. In: Procs. of the 17th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence (ECAI’06), pp. 721–722 (2006)
Brafman, R., Tennenholtz, M.: On partially controlled multi-agent systems. Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research (JAIR) 4, 477–507 (1996)
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2007 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
About this paper
Cite this paper
Boella, G., van der Torre, L. (2007). Power in Norm Negotiation. In: Nguyen, N.T., Grzech, A., Howlett, R.J., Jain, L.C. (eds) Agent and Multi-Agent Systems: Technologies and Applications. KES-AMSTA 2007. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 4496. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-72830-6_45
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-72830-6_45
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-72829-0
Online ISBN: 978-3-540-72830-6
eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)