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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNAI,volume 4496))

Abstract

In social mechanism design, norm negotiation creates individual or contractual obligations fulfilling goals of the agents. The social delegation cycle distinguishes among social goal negotiation, obligation and sanction negotiation and norm acceptance. Power may affect norm negotiation in various ways, and we therefore introduce a new formalization of the social delegation cycle based on power and dependence, without referring to the rule structure of norms, actions, decision variables, tasks, and so on.

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Ngoc Thanh Nguyen Adam Grzech Robert J. Howlett Lakhmi C. Jain

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© 2007 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Boella, G., van der Torre, L. (2007). Power in Norm Negotiation. In: Nguyen, N.T., Grzech, A., Howlett, R.J., Jain, L.C. (eds) Agent and Multi-Agent Systems: Technologies and Applications. KES-AMSTA 2007. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 4496. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-72830-6_45

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-72830-6_45

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-72829-0

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-72830-6

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