Abstract
In this paper, we study the problem of maximizing welfare in combinatorial auctions with k duplicates of each item, where bidders are subadditive. We present two approximation algorithms for k-duplicates combinatorial auctions with subadditive bidders. First, we give a factor-\(O(\sqrt{m})\) approximation algorithm for k-duplicates combinatorial auctions with subadditive valuations using value queries. This algorithm is also incentive compatible. Secondly, we give a factor-O(logm) approximation algorithm for k-duplicates combinatorial auctions with subadditive valuations using demand queries.
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Chen, W., Meng, J. (2007). Approximation Algorithms for k-Duplicates Combinatorial Auctions with Subadditive Bidders. In: Dress, A., Xu, Y., Zhu, B. (eds) Combinatorial Optimization and Applications. COCOA 2007. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 4616. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-73556-4_19
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-73556-4_19
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-73555-7
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