Abstract
This paper attends to the problem of a mechanism designer seeking to influence the outcome of a strategic game based on her creditability. The mechanism designer offers additional payments to the players depending on their mutual choice of strategies in order to steer them to certain decisions. Of course, the mechanism designer aims at spending as little as possible and yet implementing her desired outcome. We present several algorithms for this optimization problem both for singleton target strategy profiles and target strategy profile regions. Furthermore, the paper shows how a bankrupt mechanism designer can decide efficiently whether strategy profiles can be implemented at no cost at all. Finally, risk-averse players and dynamic games are examined.
Supported in part by the Swiss National Science Foundation (SNF). A full version including all proofs, more simulation results and an appendix is available as TIK Report 270 at http://www.tik.ee.ethz.ch/.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
Aspnes, J., Chang, K., Yampolskiy, A.: Inoculation Strategies for Victims of Viruses and the Sum-of-Squares Partition Problem. In: Proc. 16th Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA), pp. 43–52. ACM Press, New York (2005)
Christodoulou, G., Koutsoupias, E.: The Price of Anarchy of Finite Congestion Games. In: Proc. 37th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC), pp. 67–73. ACM Press, New York (2005)
Cole, R., Dodis, Y., Roughgarden, T.: How Much Can Taxes Help Selfish Routing? In: Proc. 4th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC), pp. 98–107. ACM Press, New York (2003)
Cole, R., Dodis, Y., Roughgarden, T.: Pricing Network Edges for Heterogeneous Selfish Users. In: Proc. 35th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC), pp. 521–530. ACM Press, New York (2003)
Dash, R., Parkes, D., Jennings, N.: Computational Mechanism Design: A Call to Arms. In: IEEE Intelligent Systems, IEEE Computer Society Press, Los Alamitos (2003)
Fabrikant, A., Luthra, A., Maneva, E., Papadimitriou, C.H., Shenker, S.: On a Network Creation Game. In: Proc. 22nd Annual Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing (PODC), pp. 347–351 (2003)
Johnson, D.S.: Approximation Algorithms for Combinatorial Problems. Journal of Computer and System Sciences 9, 256–278 (1974)
Lovász, L.: On the Ratio of Optimal Integral and Fractional Covers. Discrete Mathematics 13, 391–398 (1975)
Maskin, E., Sjöström, T.: Handbook of Social Choice Theory and Welfare (Implementation Theory), vol. 1. North-Holland, Amsterdam (2002)
Monderer, D., Tennenholtz, M.: k-Implementation. In: Proc. 4th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC), pp. 19–28. ACM Press, New York (2003)
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2007 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
About this paper
Cite this paper
Eidenbenz, R., Oswald, Y.A., Schmid, S., Wattenhofer, R. (2007). Mechanism Design by Creditability . In: Dress, A., Xu, Y., Zhu, B. (eds) Combinatorial Optimization and Applications. COCOA 2007. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 4616. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-73556-4_24
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-73556-4_24
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-73555-7
Online ISBN: 978-3-540-73556-4
eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)