Abstract
Our research is motivated by finding auction protocols to elegantly coordinate the sellers and buyers when there are multiple auctions. In our model, there are multiple sellers selling different items that are substitute to each other, multiple buyers each demanding exactly one item, and a market that is monopolistic competitive. We implement our auction coordination protocol by polynomial running time algorithms and establishes its incentive compatibleness.
This research is supported by SRG grant (7001989) of City University of Hong Kong.
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Liu, P.C., Sun, A.W. (2007). On Coordination Among Multiple Auctions. In: Preparata, F.P., Fang, Q. (eds) Frontiers in Algorithmics. FAW 2007. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 4613. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-73814-5_10
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-73814-5_10
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