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International Symposium on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science

MFCS 2007: Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science 2007 pp 621–632Cite as

Extending the Notion of Rationality of Selfish Agents: Second Order Nash Equilibria

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNTCS,volume 4708))

Abstract

Motivated by the increasing interest of the Computer Science community in the study and understanding of non-cooperative systems, we present a novel model for formalizing the rational behavior of agents with a more farsighted view of the consequences of their actions. This approach yields a framework creating new equilibria, which we call Second Order equilibria, starting from a ground set of traditional ones. By applying our approach to pure Nash equilibria, we define the set of Second Order Nash equilibria and present their applications to the Prisoner’s Dilemma game, to an instance of Braess’s Paradox in the W ardrop model and to the KP model with identical machines.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Dipartimento di Matematica “Ennio De Giorgi”, Università del Salento, Provinciale Lecce-Arnesano, P.O. Box 193, 73100 Lecce, Italy

    Vittorio Bilò

  2. Dipartimento di Informatica, Università di L’Aquila, Via Vetoio, Loc. Coppito, 67100 L’Aquila, Italy

    Michele Flammini

Authors
  1. Vittorio Bilò
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  2. Michele Flammini
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Luděk Kučera Antonín Kučera

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Bilò, V., Flammini, M. (2007). Extending the Notion of Rationality of Selfish Agents: Second Order Nash Equilibria. In: Kučera, L., Kučera, A. (eds) Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science 2007. MFCS 2007. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 4708. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-74456-6_55

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-74456-6_55

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-74455-9

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-74456-6

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