Abstract
Information flow and in particular noninterference ensure that sensitive information does not affect public information. But noninterference is too restrictive: real computing systems sometimes need to dynamically release certain amount of sensitive information. In this paper, we propose a new security property that requires the decision to perform information release have high integrity, and permits low integrity data which comes from untrusted sources to dynamically affect information release by upgrading (or endorsing) its integrity. To control such integrity upgrading, we introduce an endorsement mechanism that takes the form of a local integrity endorsing policy declaration. So the programmer can express more precise ways of endorsing, by specifying the integrity levels from which information may be endorsed. In addition, we show a new type system to enforce the security property.
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Jiang, L., Ping, L., Pan, X. (2007). Handling Dynamic Information Release. In: Nam, KH., Rhee, G. (eds) Information Security and Cryptology - ICISC 2007. ICISC 2007. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 4817. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-76788-6_6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-76788-6_6
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-76787-9
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