Abstract
When a distributed system may need to operate in the presence of an adversary, when it must support the activities of parties that do not trust one another fully, then cryptographic protocols will play a fundamental role in its design. One example of their importance is their ability to allow principals to agree on keys that will be shared for a session with an authenticated peer. But more fundamentally, a cryptographic protocol is a mechanism to achieve agreement among specific sets of peers, whether on keys or other values. Thus, they can play a fundamental role in organizing transactions in distributed systems, and coordinating interactions among principals.
Supported by the MITRE-Sponsored Research Program.
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Guttman, J.D. (2007). How to do Things with Cryptographic Protocols. In: Cervesato, I. (eds) Advances in Computer Science – ASIAN 2007. Computer and Network Security. ASIAN 2007. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 4846. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-76929-3_14
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-76929-3_14
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