Abstract
We introduce a new solution concept for complete information games, which we call equilibrium in group dominant strategies. This concept is the strongest of all known solution concepts so far, since it encompasses both the ideas behind the concepts of dominant strategies and strong equilibrium. Because of its strength, a solution in group dominant strategies does not exist in any interesting game; however, as we show, such solutions can be achieved in various rich settings with the use of mediators.
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© 2007 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Rozenfeld, O., Tennenholtz, M. (2007). Group Dominant Strategies. In: Deng, X., Graham, F.C. (eds) Internet and Network Economics. WINE 2007. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 4858. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-77105-0_50
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-77105-0_50
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-77104-3
Online ISBN: 978-3-540-77105-0
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