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Space-Efficient Kleptography Without Random Oracles

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Information Hiding (IH 2007)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 4567))

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Abstract

In the past, hiding asymmetric backdoors inside cryptosystems required a random oracle assumption (idealization) as “randomizers” of the hidden channels. The basic question left open is whether cryptography itself based on traditional hardness assumption(s) alone enables “internal randomized channels” that enable the embedding of an asymmetric backdoor inside another cryptosystem while retaining the security of the cryptosystem and the backdoor (two security proofs in one system). This question translates into the existence of kleptographic channels without the idealization of random oracle functions. We therefore address the basic problem of controlling the probability distribution over information (i.e., the kleptogram) that is hidden within the output of a cryptographic system. We settle this question by presenting an elliptic curve asymmetric backdoor construction that solves this problem. As an example, we apply the construction to produce a provably secure asymmetric backdoor in SSL. The construction is general and applies to many other kleptographic settings as well.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Cryptovirology Labs, USA

    Adam L. Young

  2. RSA Labs and Columbia University, USA

    Moti M. Yung

Authors
  1. Adam L. Young
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  2. Moti M. Yung
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Bretagne Atlantique Research Centre, INRIA Rennes, Campus universitaire de Beaulieu, 35042, Rennes cedex, France

    Teddy Furon

  2. Gipsa-lab Grenoble, CNRS, 961, rue de la Houille Blanche, BP 46, 38042, St. Martin d’Hères Cedex, France

    François Cayre

  3. University College London, Adastral Park, Ross Building 2, IP5 3RE, Martlesham, UK

    Gwenaël Doërr

  4. Gipsa-lab Grenoble, CNRS, 961 rue de la Houille Blanche Domaine universitaire, B.P. 46, 38402, Saint Martin d’Hères cedex, France

    Patrick Bas

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Young, A.L., Yung, M.M. (2007). Space-Efficient Kleptography Without Random Oracles. In: Furon, T., Cayre, F., Doërr, G., Bas, P. (eds) Information Hiding. IH 2007. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 4567. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-77370-2_8

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-77370-2_8

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-77369-6

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-77370-2

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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