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MACE: A Multi-attribute Combinatorial Exchange

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Book cover Negotiation, Auctions, and Market Engineering

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Business Information Processing ((LNBIP,volume 2))

Abstract

The Grid is a promising technology for providing access to distributed computational capabilities such as processors or storage space. One of the key problems in current Grid infrastructures is deciding which jobs are to be allocated to which resources at what time. In this context, the use of market mechanisms for allocating resources is a promising approach toward solving these problems. This paper proposes an auction mechanism for allocating and scheduling computer resources which have multiple quality attributes and time constraints. The mechanism is evaluated according to its economic performance by means of a numerical simulation.

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Henner Gimpel Nicholas R. Jennings Gregory E. Kersten Axel Ockenfels Christof Weinhardt

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Schnizler, B. (2008). MACE: A Multi-attribute Combinatorial Exchange. In: Gimpel, H., Jennings, N.R., Kersten, G.E., Ockenfels, A., Weinhardt, C. (eds) Negotiation, Auctions, and Market Engineering. Lecture Notes in Business Information Processing, vol 2. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-77554-6_7

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-77554-6_7

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-77553-9

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-77554-6

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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