Abstract
We give an alternative security proof for NMAC and HMAC when deployed as a message authentication code, supplementing the previous result by Bellare (Crypto 2006). We show that (black-box) non-malleability and unpredictability of the compression function suffice in this case, yielding security under different assumptions. This also suggests that some sort of non-malleability is a desirable design goal for hash functions.
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References
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Fischlin, M. (2008). Security of NMAC and HMAC Based on Non-malleability. In: Malkin, T. (eds) Topics in Cryptology – CT-RSA 2008. CT-RSA 2008. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 4964. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-79263-5_9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-79263-5_9
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