Abstract
Responding to the PIN cracking attacks from Berkman and Ostrovsky (FC 2007), we outline a simple solution called salted-PIN. Instead of sending the regular user PIN, salted-PIN requires an ATM to generate a Transport Final PIN from a user PIN, account number, and a salt value (stored on the bank card) through, e.g., a pseudo-random function. We explore different attacks on this solution, and propose a variant of salted-PIN that can significantly restrict known attacks. Salted-PIN requires modifications to service points (e.g. ATMs), issuer/verification facilities, and bank cards; however, changes to intermediate switches are not required.
Version: June 13, 2008.
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Mannan, M., van Oorschot, P.C. (2008). Weighing Down “The Unbearable Lightness of PIN Cracking”. In: Tsudik, G. (eds) Financial Cryptography and Data Security. FC 2008. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 5143. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-85230-8_14
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-85230-8_14
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-85229-2
Online ISBN: 978-3-540-85230-8
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