Abstract
Peer-to-Peer (P2P) communication model has the potential to harness huge amounts of resources. However, due to the self-organizing and self-maintaining nature, current P2P networks suffer from various kinds of attacks. Public key authentication can provide a fundamental building block for P2P communication security. In this paper, we propose a scalable Byzantine fault tolerant public key authentication scheme for P2P networks, in which each participating peer dynamically maintains a trusted group to perform distributed challenge-response authentication without centralized infrastructure. To guarantee the authentication correctness, we additionally present a complementary trusted group maintenance scheme. The experimental results demonstrate that our authentication scheme can work in various different P2P scenarios effectively and efficiently.
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Chen, R., Guo, W., Tang, L., Hu, J., Chen, Z. (2008). Scalable Byzantine Fault Tolerant Public Key Authentication for Peer-to-Peer Networks. In: Luque, E., Margalef, T., Benítez, D. (eds) Euro-Par 2008 – Parallel Processing. Euro-Par 2008. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 5168. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-85451-7_64
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-85451-7_64
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
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