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Deterrence and Defeasibility in Argumentation Process for ALIS Project

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Computable Models of the Law

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNAI,volume 4884))

Abstract

Argumentation issues, which are of core importance to ALIS, are addressed through a particular category of qualitative games called Games of Deterrence. The graphs associated with those games are interpreted as sets of inferences sequences between statements in the framework of non-monotonic logic. Thus an argumentation process is interpreted as a game of deterrence, which resolution determines the truth or falsity of statements, and the possible argumentation strategies of the parties.

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Rudnianski, M., Bestougeff, H. (2008). Deterrence and Defeasibility in Argumentation Process for ALIS Project. In: Casanovas, P., Sartor, G., Casellas, N., Rubino, R. (eds) Computable Models of the Law. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 4884. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-85569-9_14

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-85569-9_14

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-85568-2

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-85569-9

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