Abstract
Bargaining power has a major influence in negotiations. Up to now, a lot of electronic negotiation models have been developed and manifold negotiation challenges have been already addressed, but mainly related to the structure and the process of the negotiation. However, research concerning bargaining power is still inadequate represented. Thus, in order to contribute to the state of the art of electronic negotiations, this paper shows a bilateral automated negotiation mechanism that considers bargaining power.
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Buettner, R., Kirn, S. (2008). Bargaining Power in Electronic Negotiations: A Bilateral Negotiation Mechanism. In: Psaila, G., Wagner, R. (eds) E-Commerce and Web Technologies. EC-Web 2008. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 5183. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-85717-4_10
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-85717-4_10
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