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Provable Security against Impossible Differential Cryptanalysis Application to CS-Cipher

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Modelling, Computation and Optimization in Information Systems and Management Sciences (MCO 2008)

Abstract

In this document we present a new way to bound the probability of occurrence of an n-round differential in the context of differential cryptanalysis. Hence this new model allows us to claim proof of resistance against impossible differential cryptanalysis, as defined by Biham and al. in 1999. This work will be described through the example of CS-Cipher, to which, assuming some non-trivial hypothesis, provable security against impossible differential cryptanalysis is obtained.

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References

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Roche, T., Gillard, R., Roch, JL. (2008). Provable Security against Impossible Differential Cryptanalysis Application to CS-Cipher. In: Le Thi, H.A., Bouvry, P., Pham Dinh, T. (eds) Modelling, Computation and Optimization in Information Systems and Management Sciences. MCO 2008. Communications in Computer and Information Science, vol 14. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-87477-5_63

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-87477-5_63

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-87476-8

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-87477-5

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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