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Two Types of Key-Compromise Impersonation Attacks against One-Pass Key Establishment Protocols

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E-business and Telecommunications (ICETE 2007)

Part of the book series: Communications in Computer and Information Science ((CCIS,volume 23))

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Abstract

Key establishment protocols are among the most important security mechanisms via which two or more parties can encrypt their communications over an insecure network. This paper is concerned with the vulnerability of one-pass two-party key establishment protocols to key-compromise impersonation (K-CI) attacks. The latter may occur once an adversary has obtained the long-term private key of an honest party, and represent a serious — but often underestimated — threat, because a successful impersonation attack may result in far greater harm than the reading of past and future conversations. Our aim is to describe two main classes of K-CI attacks that can be mounted against all of the best-known one-pass protocols, including MQV and HMQV. We show that one of the attacks described can be somewhat avoided (though not completely eliminated) through the combined use of digital signatures and time-stamps; however, there still remains a class of K-CI threats for which there is no obvious solution.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Computational Systems and Software Engineering Laboratory Department of Applied Informatics, University of Macedonia, 156 Egnatia St., Thessaloniki, Greece

    K. Chalkias, F. Baldimtsi, D. Hristu-Varsakelis & G. Stephanides

Authors
  1. K. Chalkias
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  2. F. Baldimtsi
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  3. D. Hristu-Varsakelis
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  4. G. Stephanides
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Polytechnic Institute of Setúbal – INSTICC,, Av. D. Manuel I, 27A - 2. Esq., 2910-595, Setúbal, Portugal

    Joaquim Filipe

  2. Department of Computer Science, Monmouth University, West Long Branch, NJ 07764, U.S.A.

    Mohammad S. Obaidat

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Chalkias, K., Baldimtsi, F., Hristu-Varsakelis, D., Stephanides, G. (2008). Two Types of Key-Compromise Impersonation Attacks against One-Pass Key Establishment Protocols. In: Filipe, J., Obaidat, M.S. (eds) E-business and Telecommunications. ICETE 2007. Communications in Computer and Information Science, vol 23. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-88653-2_17

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-88653-2_17

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-88652-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-88653-2

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