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International Workshop on Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce

Workshop on Trading Agent Design and Analysis

AMEC 2007, TADA 2007: Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce and Trading Agent Design and Analysis pp 200–216Cite as

On the Behavior of Competing Markets Populated by Automated Traders

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Business Information Processing ((LNBIP,volume 13))

Abstract

Real market institutions, stock and commodity exchanges for example, do not occur in isolation. Company stock is frequently listed on several stock exchanges, allowing traders to potentially trade such stock in different markets. While there has been extensive research into agent-based trading in individual markets, there is little work on agents that trade in such multiple market scenarios. Our work seeks to address this imbalance. Here we provide an initial analysis of the behavior of trading agents that are free to move between a number of parallel markets, where markets are able to charge traders in a variety of ways. We show the movement of traders between markets, sketch some adaptive strategies that markets may use to adjust charges, evaluate the effectiveness of these strategies, and give some results which show the effect of trader movement on properties of the markets.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Computer Science, Graduate Center, City University of New York, 365, 5th Avenue, New York, NY 10016, USA

    Jinzhong Niu, Kai Cai, Simon Parsons & Elizabeth Sklar

  2. Department of Computer and Information Science, Brooklyn College, City University of New York, 2900 Bedford Avenue, Brooklyn, NY 11210, USA

    Simon Parsons & Elizabeth Sklar

Authors
  1. Jinzhong Niu
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  2. Kai Cai
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  3. Simon Parsons
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  4. Elizabeth Sklar
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Dept of Computer Science and Engineering, University of Minnesota, 200 Union St SE, MN 55455, Minneapolis, USA

    John Collins

  2. Strands, 760 SW Madison, STE 106, OR 97333, Corvallis, USA

    Peyman Faratin

  3. Department of Computer and Information Science, City University of New York, Brooklyn College, 2900 Bedford Avenue, NY 11210, Brooklyn, USA

    Simon Parsons  & Elizabeth Sklar  & 

  4. Institut d’Investigacio en Intel.ligencia Artificial (IIIA), Campus de la UAB, 08193, Bellaterra, Spain

    Juan A. Rodriguez-Aguilar

  5. ISR - School of Computer Science, Carnegie Mellon University, 5000 Forbes Avenue, PA 15213-3891, Pittsburgh, USA

    Norman M. Sadeh

  6. IBM Haifa Research Lab, Haifa University Campus, Mount Carmel, 31905, Haifa, Israel

    Onn Shehory

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© 2008 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Niu, J., Cai, K., Parsons, S., Sklar, E. (2008). On the Behavior of Competing Markets Populated by Automated Traders. In: Collins, J., et al. Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce and Trading Agent Design and Analysis. AMEC TADA 2007 2007. Lecture Notes in Business Information Processing, vol 13. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-88713-3_14

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-88713-3_14

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-88712-6

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-88713-3

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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