Abstract
Low latency mix networks such as onion routing (Tor), heavily utilize cryptographic operations for transmitting a message to the receiver resulting in substantial computational and communication overhead. To address the performance and security issues of low latency mix networks, we propose a novel anonymous routing scheme called C-Mix. Its design principles are inspired by network coding techniques and the properties of polynomial interpolation. Based on our security analysis and performance evaluations, C-Mix achieves same level of anonymity with comparable computation overhead in comparison to traditional low latency mix networks.
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Kandiah, V., Huang, D., Kapoor, H. (2008). C-Mix: A Lightweight Anonymous Routing Approach. In: Solanki, K., Sullivan, K., Madhow, U. (eds) Information Hiding. IH 2008. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 5284. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-88961-8_21
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-88961-8_21
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