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Security for Signcryption: The Multi-User Model

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Practical Signcryption

Part of the book series: Information Security and Cryptography ((ISC))

Abstract

This chapter presents security models for confidentiality and unforgeability of signcryption schemes in the multi-user setting. A family of security models for signcryption in both two-user and multi-user settings was presented by An et al. [10] in their work on signcryption schemes built from black-box signature and encryption schemes—see Chap. 2.

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References

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Correspondence to Joonsang Baek .

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Baek, J., Steinfeld, R. (2010). Security for Signcryption: The Multi-User Model. In: Dent, A., Zheng, Y. (eds) Practical Signcryption. Information Security and Cryptography. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-89411-7_3

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-89411-7_3

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-89409-4

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-89411-7

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