Abstract
This paper presents an evolutionary bargaining model between two groups of buyers and sellers. One buyer and one seller are randomly matched to play the Nash demand game: they choose a best reply based on information about past bargains coming from other members of their group. Information arrival is modeled as a Poisson process, and the rates of these processes form a weighted communication network. Over the long run, the stochastically stable division is the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution (ANB) with weights determined by the structure of the communication network in each group. The optimal networks for a group are (quasi)-regular networks without weak links.
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Gallo, E. (2008). A Network-Based Asymmetric Nash Bargaining Solution. In: Papadimitriou, C., Zhang, S. (eds) Internet and Network Economics. WINE 2008. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 5385. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-92185-1_38
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-92185-1_38
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-92184-4
Online ISBN: 978-3-540-92185-1
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