Abstract
We study the Combinatorial Public Project Problem (CPPP) in which n agents are assigned a subset of m resources of size k so as to maximize the social welfare. Combinatorial public projects are an abstraction of many resource-assignment problems (Internet-related network design, elections, etc.). It is known that if all agents have submodular valuations then a constant approximation is achievable in polynomial time. However, submodularity is a strong assumption that does not always hold in practice. We show that (unlike similar problems such as combinatorial auctions) even slight relaxations of the submodularity assumption result in non-constant lower bounds for approximation.
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Schapira, M., Singer, Y. (2008). Inapproximability of Combinatorial Public Projects. In: Papadimitriou, C., Zhang, S. (eds) Internet and Network Economics. WINE 2008. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 5385. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-92185-1_41
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-92185-1_41
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
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