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Asynchronous Best-Reply Dynamics

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Book cover Internet and Network Economics (WINE 2008)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNISA,volume 5385))

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Abstract

In many real-world settings (e.g., interdomain routing in the Internet) strategic agents are instructed to follow best-reply dynamics in asynchronous environments. In such settings players learn of each other’s actions via update messages that can be delayed or even lost. In particular, several players might update their actions simultaneously, or make choices based on outdated information. In this paper we analyze the convergence of best- (and better-)reply dynamics in asynchronous environments. We provide sufficient conditions, and necessary conditions for convergence in such settings, and also study the convergence-rate of these natural dynamics.

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References

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Google Tel-Aviv and The School of Computer Science and Engineering, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel

    Noam Nisan

  2. The School of Computer Science and Engineering, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel

    Michael Schapira & Aviv Zohar

Authors
  1. Noam Nisan
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  2. Michael Schapira
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  3. Aviv Zohar
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Computer Science Division, University of California at Berkeley, Berkeley, CA, USA

    Christos Papadimitriou

  2. Department of Systems Engineering and Engineering Management, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shatin, N.T., Hong Kong

    Shuzhong Zhang

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© 2008 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Nisan, N., Schapira, M., Zohar, A. (2008). Asynchronous Best-Reply Dynamics. In: Papadimitriou, C., Zhang, S. (eds) Internet and Network Economics. WINE 2008. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 5385. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-92185-1_59

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-92185-1_59

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-92184-4

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-92185-1

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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