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Nonlinear Pricing with Network Externalities

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNISA,volume 5385))

Abstract

This paper considers the screening problem faced by a monopolist of a network good in a general setting. We fully characterize the optimal contracts in the joint presence of network externalities and asymmetric information about agents’ types. We find that the pattern of consumption distortion crucially depends on the degree of network congestability. It is shown that an optimal consumption scheme exhibits a two-way distortion, no distortion on the top, or one-way distortion if and only if network is congestible, neutral-congestible or discongestible.

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References

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© 2008 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Meng, D., Tian, G., Sun, L. (2008). Nonlinear Pricing with Network Externalities. In: Papadimitriou, C., Zhang, S. (eds) Internet and Network Economics. WINE 2008. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 5385. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-92185-1_78

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-92185-1_78

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-92184-4

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-92185-1

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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