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Proxy Restrictions for Grid Usage

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNTCS,volume 5529))

Abstract

The scale and power of Grid infrastructures makes them an inviting target for attack. Even if the Grid software is secure the Grid infrastructure is vulnerable via operating system vulnerabilities and misconfiguration. One of the worst results of the exploit of these vulnerabilities is user proxy credential compromise. This paper describes a pragmatic and simple way, using proxy certificate extensions, to mitigate the damage in case of credential compromise. The potential damage is limited by restricting the range of hosts that the credentials can be used to open connections to and be accepted from. This paper also describes a way to help investigate credential delegation problems.

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References

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© 2009 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Hahkala, J., White, J., Frohner, Á. (2009). Proxy Restrictions for Grid Usage. In: Abdennadher, N., Petcu, D. (eds) Advances in Grid and Pervasive Computing. GPC 2009. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 5529. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-01671-4_5

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-01671-4_5

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-01670-7

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-01671-4

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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