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Protocol Security and Algebraic Properties: Decision Results for a Bounded Number of Sessions

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Rewriting Techniques and Applications (RTA 2009)

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Abstract

We consider the problem of deciding the security of cryptographic protocols for a bounded number of sessions, taking into account some algebraic properties of the security primitives, for instance Abelian group properties. We propose a general method for deriving decision algorithms, splitting the task into 4 properties of the rewriting system describing the intruder capabilities: locality, conservativity, finite variant property and decidability of one-step deducibility constraints. We illustrate this method on a non trivial example, combining several Abelian Group properties, exponentiation and a homomorphism, showing a decidability result for this combination.

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Bursuc, S., Comon-Lundh, H. (2009). Protocol Security and Algebraic Properties: Decision Results for a Bounded Number of Sessions. In: Treinen, R. (eds) Rewriting Techniques and Applications. RTA 2009. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 5595. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-02348-4_10

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-02348-4_10

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-02347-7

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-02348-4

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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