Abstract
We present a connectionist model for the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma game which we explored in different game-playing environments. The role of anticipation on cooperation and coordination was our main interest. The model was validated by comparisons with human subjects’ experiments in which subjects played individually against a computer opponent. After reproducing several interesting characteristics of individual play, we used the model in multi-agent simulations of small societies in which agents interacted among each-other by playing the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma game. In genetic simulations, we demonstrated how anticipation will evolve in the societies to achieve either higher cooperation rates or payoffs. Our results favor the assumption that anticipation is decisive for high level of cooperation and higher cooperative coordination in the simulated societies.
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Grinberg, M., Lalev, E. (2009). The Role of Anticipation on Cooperation and Coordination in Simulated Prisoner’s Dilemma Game Playing. In: Pezzulo, G., Butz, M.V., Sigaud, O., Baldassarre, G. (eds) Anticipatory Behavior in Adaptive Learning Systems. ABiALS 2008. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 5499. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-02565-5_12
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-02565-5_12
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
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