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Multi-recipient Public-Key Encryption from Simulators in Security Proofs

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Information Security and Privacy (ACISP 2009)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 5594))

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Abstract

In PKC 2003, Bellare, Boldyreva, and Staddon proposed the reproducibility test. The test determines whether a single-recipient public-key encryption scheme is adapted to transform into an efficient multi-recipient public-key encryption scheme. In this paper, we propose a new approach to design an efficient multi-recipient single-message public-key encryption scheme. We focus on a certain simulator which appears in the security proof of an ordinary (single-recipient) public-key encryption scheme. By considering the behavior of the simulator, we construct two efficient multi-recipient single-message public-key encryption schemes. These schemes show that there exist schemes which can be transformed into efficient multi-recipient schemes, even they do not pass the reproducibility test.

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Hiwatari, H., Tanaka, K., Asano, T., Sakumoto, K. (2009). Multi-recipient Public-Key Encryption from Simulators in Security Proofs. In: Boyd, C., González Nieto, J. (eds) Information Security and Privacy. ACISP 2009. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 5594. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-02620-1_21

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-02620-1_21

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-02619-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-02620-1

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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