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Google’s Auction for TV Ads

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Automata, Languages and Programming (ICALP 2009)

Abstract

This document describes the auction system used by Google for allocation and pricing of TV ads. It is based on a simultaneous ascending auction, and has been in use since September 2008.

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References

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© 2009 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Nisan, N. et al. (2009). Google’s Auction for TV Ads. In: Albers, S., Marchetti-Spaccamela, A., Matias, Y., Nikoletseas, S., Thomas, W. (eds) Automata, Languages and Programming. ICALP 2009. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 5556. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-02930-1_26

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-02930-1_26

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-02929-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-02930-1

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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