Abstract
Request for Proposal (RFP) problem is a type of task allocation problem where task managers need to recruit service provider agents to handle complex tasks composed of multiple sub-tasks, with the objective being to assign each sub-task to a capable agent while keeping the cost as low as possible. Most existing approaches either involve centralized algorithms or require each agent’s cost for doing each sub-task to be known publicly beforehand, or attempt to force the agents to disclose such information by means of truth-telling mechanism, which is not practical in many problems where such information is sensitive and private. In this paper, we present an efficient multi-auction based mechanism that can produce near-optimal solutions without violating the privacy of the participating agents. By including an extra verification step after each bid, we can guarantee convergence to a solution while achieving optimal results in over 97% of the times in a series of experiment.
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Chan, CK., Leung, HF. (2009). Multi-auction Approach for Solving Task Allocation Problem. In: Lukose, D., Shi, Z. (eds) Multi-Agent Systems for Society. PRIMA 2005. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 4078. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-03339-1_20
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-03339-1_20
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-03337-7
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-03339-1
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