Abstract
“Classical” program development by refinement [12,2,3] is a technique for ensuring that source-level program code remains faithful to the semantic goals set out in its corresponding specification. Until recently the method has not extended to security-style properties, principally because classical refinement semantics is inadequate in security contexts [7].
The Shadow semantics introduced by Morgan [13] is an abstraction of probabilistic program semantics [11], and is rich enough to distinguish between refinements that do preserve noninterference security properties and those that don’t. In this paper we give a formal development of Private Information Retrieval [4]; in doing so we extend the general theory of secure refinement by introducing a new kind of security annotation for programs.
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McIver, A.K. (2009). The Secret Art of Computer Programming. In: Leucker, M., Morgan, C. (eds) Theoretical Aspects of Computing - ICTAC 2009. ICTAC 2009. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 5684. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-03466-4_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-03466-4_3
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